Megabyte punch a10 windows 7#
Microsoft’s modifications to the Windows 7 platform, specifically diagnostic and “telemetry” analysis and reporting, represents a material deviation from the original product platform representing a material and tangible delineation from the original product. Microsoft violates “Good Faith” efforts respecting customer’s enjoined under existing licensure/product and End User Licensing Agreement(s) via contractual binding(s). Federal Court, A CIVIL CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT FOR HARM(S) AND DAMAGE(S) FOR MATERIAL BREACH OF CONTRACT, PRODUCT MIS-REPRESENTATION (possibly criminal fraud), AND FAILURE TO ACT IN “GOOD FAITH” UNDER CONTRACTUAL LAW. What are your suggestions ?Ī first run attempt at the EULA for Microsoft Windows, not by way of the agreement (text of the EULA) but to the construct of the agreement entered into (the act of enjoining the agreement, enforcement) using a “good faith” mis-represenation Robinson, you might like where I am going with this…Ī DRAFT ACTION, MOTION TO PETITION U.S. The idea is to make it more expensive to dig out the wrapped keys by punishing unclean decaps so that extracting the sensitive encrypted keys or key shares needs a totally clean decap which is known to be a very rare thing as most decaps are not 100% clean.
Megabyte punch a10 password#
I am thinking if a variety of techniques can be applied to data stored on hardware below to make extracting the wrapped secret harder.ġ.) The secret is usually stored on the EEPROM so if I make every sequential 32 byte block of EEPROM data XOR onto each other which would mean if someone decaps uncleanly, it will affect the entire recovery of the wrapped secrets.Ģ.) The PBKDF2 key derived from password would consult a lookup table of 256 possible 32 byte random data which are created at device setup and the lookup results would be used to driventhe step 1.) De-obfuscation of the entire desired EEPROM data range The use of PBKDF2 is due to smart card hardware being very limited in processing power, speed and resource. If I use a PBKDF2-SHA-512 to derive a key to encrypt a master key or it’s key share and store them into a smart card, someone who decaps the chip to extract the PBKDF2 key encrypted key could run PBKDF2 for a password to form the KEK to decrypt the master key or key share that the PBKDF2 derived key protects offline. My scenario is I do not want to use paper keys and I need to encrypt the master key be it in key share form or not. There are many methods to ensure security of secret keys stored in a tamper resistant crypto chip.